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Abstract:  Oil booms have brought unprecedented wealth and development to some countries while in others this 
has not been the case.  The latter is attributed to the resource curse phenomenon which has been explained by the 
Dutch disease and more recently by poor quality institutions.  This paper is a three country comparative assessment 
of how countries have utilised their oil revenues and the extent to which key policy environments, such as 
institutional and political aspects, may have influenced different outcomes.  Evidence shows that in Nigeria, oil 
has been more of a curse because institutions have not been strong enough to efficiently manage the vast oil 
revenue to have a positive impact on the economy and for the benefit of its people.  In Norway, the management 
of oil resources reflects the view of decision makers that the resources belong to current and future generations, 
and therefore the development of the industry should benefit both generations.  Appropriate institutions and 
policies such as the Petroleum Pension Fund, Sovereign Wealth Fund, a more diverse economy and a fiscal rule 
for controlling, and more targeted, expenditures were implemented.  These, in addition, to a very stable democratic 
political environment and effective legal system meant that oil has become a blessing to Norway. The UAE has a 
similar but different approach to Norway, by using oil as a basis for sustained development. It has a Sovereign 
Wealth Fund, and focuses on distribution of the oil-wealth and investment in social and economic infrastructure 
leading to a more diverse economy. The nature of its political stability, although essential to avoiding the curse, 
is different from Norway’s and there is potential for tension and conflict.  For developing countries in general, 
good governance, accountability, high government effectiveness, appropriate regulations and anti-corruption 
policies will help link natural resources with high sustained economic growth and turn the resource from a curse 
to blessing. 
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Oil discoveries, and subsequent booms in the economy, have brought unprecedented growth 
and development to many previously poor countries. However, others have experienced what 
has been referred to as the resource curse, a concept which points to the contradictory effects 
of natural resource abundance on economic development [1, 2, 3, 4]. Weak economic 
performance of some oil rich countries indicate that natural resources are often more of a curse 
than a blessing for these countries. The resource curse examines the negative effects of large 
quantities of natural resources on economic growth from an economic and political perspective. 
The term ‘resource curse’ was first used in the formal economics literature by Auty [5] to 
describe how countries rich in natural resources were unable to use that wealth to boost their 
economies and how, counter-intuitively, these countries had lower economic growth than 
countries without an abundance of natural resources. The concept was later the subject of 
extensive research including the studies carried out by Sachs and Warner [6]who found the 
existence of a negative association between natural resources and growth.  
The appreciation of the real domestic exchange rate, known as the Dutch disease, has been 
noted as the main reason for the poor economic performance of oil rich countries Dutch disease 
manifests itself when labour and capital migrate from other sectors to the booming sector, 
causing real exchange rates to rise as a result of the booming economy.  This presents a scenario 
where all other sectors of a country’s economy suffer owing to the rapid growth in income 
from natural resources, which in turn creates higher costs and a reduction in competitiveness 
for domestically produced goods and services in previously effective productive sectors. This 
happens because increased revenues from natural resource exports tend to increase the value 
of the exporting nation’s currency. This makes the country’s other exports, such as agricultural 
products and manufactured goods, more expensive and therefore less competitive in world 
markets.  The economy thus becomes over reliant on the natural resources that it is exporting 
and this can be particularly damaging, if for any reason, there is a drop in world prices for those 
natural resources [7, 8, 9]. 
However, long lasting ineffective institutions, corruption and rent seeking behaviours, are 
considered to be additional major causes [10, 11]. Indeed, natural resources are not always a 
curse; they can be a blessing and lead to high economic growth and efficient economic 
performance for countries with strong institutions [12].      
In this paper we undertake an assessment and a comparative analysis of three countries, Nigeria, 
Norway, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), regarding the effects of oil windfalls, how these 
petroleum exporters have utilised their oil revenues, and the consequences of their respective 
government policies. In other words, the extent to which key policy environments, such as 
institutional and political aspects may have influenced different outcomes resulting from oil-
abundance in the respective three countries. The paper concludes that, in some countries, much 
of the potential benefit of the windfalls has dissipated, and explains why some oil producing 
countries may have a weaker, less diversified, and more dependent economy, despite the 
significant additional revenue generated from oil exports.   It is also suggested that natural 
resources alone will do little to promote economic development. Countries need sound 




economic management and it is imperative that they address institutional and political factors 
that negatively affect appropriate and prosperous policy choices. Market processes are needed 
to help allocate public resources, and governments and other key establishment individuals 
who are responsible must take full account of the risks when formulating plans for development 
and selecting projects.   
The three countries were selected owing to the differing effects of oil wealth on their economic 
development. The objective is to broaden the scope of the analysis of the potential effects that 
oil wealth can have on a country, and further emphasise key variables that may or may not lead 
to the resource curse phenomenon. Nigeria is used as a classical example of negative effects of 
oil on social and economic development. Norway is an example of a successful case of escaping 
the potential “curse” and utilising oil reserves into an economic “blessing”. The UAE provides 
an impressive case of oil-led development yet experiencing enormous social and economic 
difficulties.   
Each case study is structured as follows: a brief presentation of the history of oil discovery and 
subsequent transformations, as well as the analysis of basic economic and social data such as 
growth, unemployment, and poverty rates. The ratio of  the oil sector’s revenue to GDP and 
total exports compared to other industry sectors are seen as the key determinants of whether a 
country is over-dependant on oil revenue or not, whilst the diverse structure of the economy is 
viewed as being an indicator of positive developmental performance and vice versa. In each 
case study, the major causes and factors of either negative or positive impact of oil on economic 
development is analysed, with a focus on the institutional environment. 
2. Nigeria:  The classic case of a resource curse 
Nigeria is the largest oil producer in Africa and the sixth largest exporter in the world. Yet, 
Nigeria is unanimously presented in the literature as the classical exemplifier of the resource 
curse. The paradox is evident just by looking at some statistics. The country produces 2.4 
million barrels of crude oil daily and according to the Oil & Gas Journal [13], it holds the tenth 
largest proven oil reserves in the world, with the second largest reserves in Africa after Libya. 
The country's proven oil reserve as of 2015 stood at 37.14 billion barrels [14].  But according 
to the UN’s 2007 Human Development Index (HDI) Nigeria was amongst some of the poorest 
nations in the world and is ranked 158th out of 177 countries assessed in the index [15]. This 
position has not change significantly in the last decade. 
Before the oil boom era in the early 1970’s, the government was very dependent on revenues 
from the agricultural sector.  Nigeria was one of the key exporters of diverse agricultural 
products, such as groundnut, cotton, cocoa, palm oil, timber, hides, and skins, which are used 
in most manufacturing industries domestically and internationally. Nigeria’s agricultural 
industry used to employ over 70% of the population [16] and was the world’s largest palm oil 
exporter [17].  
The agriculture industry in Nigeria’s current economy has effectively been replaced by the oil 
industry in terms of revenue. Despite the significant oil revenue, the structural development 
has been poor and has even worsened the administrative position in Nigeria due to the level of 




corruption and oil policy implementation. The oil wealth was not invested to support the 
agriculture nor manufacturing sector, which has led to neglect and has therefore attracted 
factors of production away from agriculture and manufacturing, leading to a manifestation of 
what is termed as Dutch disease resulting in a resource curse [7].   
In general, before the oil-boom, the economy was characterised by the predominance of 
subsistence and commercial activities, with a narrow production base, ill-adapted technology; 
lopsided development owing to the bias of public policies, openness and excessive dependence 
on external factor inputs, continuous siphoning of surpluses from the economy, and especially 
weak institutional capabilities. The discovery of oil in 1956 and its subsequent exploitation 
transformed Nigeria’s political economy radically over half a century [18]. During the first 
decade of its discovery, oil did not play a significant role in the economy, as it only amounted 
to less than 10% of GDP. Yet agriculture, as the key productive sector of the Nigerian economy 
since the 1970s, was gradually crowded out by the growing oil sector, and the development of 
non-oil sectors was almost non-existent. In recent years, oil has provided approximately 80% 
of the government revenue and 95% of export earnings [19]. 
As indicated before, Human Development Indicators are quite low in Nigeria with the average 
HDI value being as low as 0.515 in 2014 (Table 1) resulting in the country being ranked at 152 
out of 188 countries.  In spite of the fact that, between 2005 and 2014 Nigeria’s HDI value 
increased by about 10% from 0.467 to 0.514, and over 1980 and 2014 life expectancy increased 
by 7.2 years, mean years of schooling increased by 0.7 (2005 – 2014), and expected years of 
schooling increased by 2.3 years, Nigeria’s HDI value has placed the country in the low human 
development group.  This is evidence of the serious negative effect of oil wealth over Nigeria's 
economy, which has been caused by the lack of promotion of a higher standard of living, 
education, income, and quality of life.  Hence, the natural resources in Nigeria could be deemed 
as more of a curse than a blessing.  
The overdependence of the economy on oil has had detrimental consequences on the social 
wellbeing of its citizens. The agricultural sector, which was once productive, is now unable to 
produce enough food for its domestic market, making the country reliant on food imports. The 
social infrastructure of the country is in disarray [20], and poverty levels are dire. According 
to UN statistics, 36% of Nigerians lived under the poverty line in 1970. In contrast, in 2007 
around 70% of citizens lived on less than $1 a day, and 92% lived on less than $2 a day [15]. 
The proportion of the population living below the poverty line increased significantly between 
1980 and 2004. According to The National Bureau of Statistics [21], 69% of Nigerians were 
living in absolute poverty in 2010 (Table 2a & 2b). Nigeria has the largest economy in Africa 
but it is affected by its limited infrastructure, particularly its transport and energy infrastructure, 
which imposes serious limitations on the country's economic growth potential. Significant 
challenges, such as power shortages, are evident in the electricity sector and this has negatively 
impacted industrial growth.  Economic growth in Nigeria is therefore constrained by 
inadequate infrastructure, electricity, incentives and policies that promote private sector 
development, and poor access to quality education. Approximately a quarter of the adult 
population lacks formal education [22]. 




In addition, unemployment in Nigeria has become one of the most critical problems facing the 
country. According to statistics from the [23, 24], Nigeria’s overall unemployment rate 
consisted of 23.9% of the total labour force in 2011, indicating a sharp increase from 14.9% in 
2008 as shown in Table 3. When disaggregated, 17.1% of unemployment is in urban areas and 
25.6% is in rural areas.    





Table 1: Nigeria - Selected Human Development Indicators (HDI) 
 




Mean years of 
schooling 
GNI per capita 
(2011 PPP$) 
HDI value 
1980 45.6 6.7  2,833  
1885 46.4 8.6  2,451  
1990 46.1 6.7  2,743  
1995 45.1 7.2  2,529  
2000 46.6 8.0  2,378  
2005 48.7 9.0 5.2 3,606 0.467 
2010 51.3 9.0 5.2 4,825 0.493 
2011 51.7 9.0 5.5 4,926 0.499 
2012 52.1 9.0 5.7 5,018 0.505 
2013 52.4 9.0 5.9 5,166 0.510 
2014 52.8 9.0 5.9 5,341 0.514 
      Source: [22] 
 
 
Table 2a: Relative poverty in Nigeria (1980-2010) 
 






1980 27.2 65 17.1 
1985 46.3 75 34.7 
1992 42.7 91.5 39.2 
1996 65.6 102.3 67.1 
2004 54.4 126.3 68.7 
2010 69.0 163 112.47 
Source: [21]   
 
 





Table 2b: National poverty incidence in Nigeria (2003/2004 and 2009/2010) 
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Source: [23, 24]  
 
Given the country’s enormous resources, it is puzzling that such a huge proportion of the 
populace lives in poverty, and there is high unemployment, low industrial and agricultural 
development, and generally poor economic and social indicators. This vast incidence of 
poverty and poor indicators in the midst of significant wealth has been linked to the endemic 
corruption in the country, as it involves the stealing of resources that would have otherwise 
been invested in providing wealth-creating infrastructure for the country’s citizens.  The 
corruption has also been sustained by the high political instability and poor management of the 
oil wealth. 
The windfall of oil revenues into the federal budget raised expectations and led to excessive 
government spending based on unrealistic revenue projections, in particular in the 1970s and 
1980s. This led to a significant increase in inflation (Figure 1), slowed down economic growth, 
and prevented development of the non–oil sector.  
  




      
Source: [25]  
 
As large amounts of public finances were channelled into private income, there followed a 
huge increase in private consumption. The pattern of that consumption was to prioritise 
imported goods, while locally manufactured products were treated as inferior which in turn 
lowered demand. Therefore, a low demand for domestic products meant that manufacturers 
reduced their demand for labour which led to a rapid fall in domestic manufacturing [15]. Oil 
revenues in the long-run had negative effects on agriculture and manufacturing growth, which 
is sufficient evidence of the presence of Dutch disease within Nigeria. The booming oil sector 
crowded out the previously productive agricultural sector and suppressed the development of 
non–oil industries [16]. The oil boom created difficulties for both agriculture and 
manufacturing by producing an overvalued exchange rate; this, in turn, made Nigerian 
agricultural and manufacturing exports less competitive on international markets, resulting in 
a reduced demand for those products. Also, Nigerian elites were politically and ideologically 
opposed to trade liberalisation, and the combination of overvalued exchange rates and trade 
restrictions kept growth in the manufacturing and agricultural sectors low [26]. Exports from 
these sectors were further hampered by unfavourable domestic pricing policies. The Nigerian 
government could have devalued the currency to support these sectors, but it chose not to do 
so. The government could have provided further incentives to the non-oil export sector, and 
simultaneously prevented significant rises in inflation, by liberalising its restrictions on trade. 
In addition, the governments made low investments, if at all, in the development of 
infrastructure, non–oil sectors and education  
The explosion of the country’s debt could also be attributable to the oil boom and inappropriate 
public finance planning of the revenue generated from oil exports. From the early 1980’s, when 

















Figure 1: Nigeria inflation rate (CPI measurement)  (1970-2014) 




oil market, Nigeria began to experience debt problems due to inappropriate public finance 
planning. External loans began to be acquired randomly without any form of due diligence. 
The debt crisis, which is the combination of accumulated debt, had imposed a huge burden on 
the Nigerian economy.  Nigeria’s public debts pushed its debt profile extremely high, and it 
has relied on that public debt to finance its development projects over the last two decades. The 
debt burden has clearly been a constraining factor on rapid economic recovery, growth and 
development, with the debt increasing at an alarming rate. Instead of allocating resources to 
crucial development projects, the burden of high public debt has caused the channelling of 
funds into debt servicing [27, 28]. The mismanaged international oil price boom and bust cycles 
has led Nigeria into enormous foreign borrowing. Before the oil boom, Nigeria’s national debt 
was very low. Between 1970 and 2004, the nation’s external debt alone increased from US$836 
million to US$38 billion [15]. Nigeria’s total national debt at the end of 2016 stood at US$31 
billion, which was equivalent to 10.2% of GDP [29]  As the total national debt to GDP is far 
below the recommended threshold of 40% for similar economies, Nigeria debt distress is 
considered to be of relatively low risk internationally [30] however the debt burden is still 
relatively high. 
Not only were a large percentage of oil revenues being channelled into debt servicing, 
enormous sums of money were extracted from Nigeria’s national treasury with no indication 
of where the money went. Some analysts estimate that over US$217.7 billion could have been 
stolen from the treasury since the beginning of oil exportation in the country [31]. Funds are 
stolen from the state through corruption, tax evasion, and illegal transfer of profits by 
multinationals. According to the Global Financial Integrity [32, 33], estimates of more than 
US$157 billion had left the country illicitly within the last decade. This high loss of revenue 
prevents Nigeria from being able to meet its economic development goals.  
It has been observed that Nigeria is the most corrupt country in the world, as it ranked 177 from 
191 countries with a score of just -1.27 out of 2.5 in 2014 [34].  Figure 2 show that Nigeria's 
average control of corruption index was -1.13 with a minimum of -1.33 in 2002 and maximum 
of -0.81 in 2008. Corruption in Nigeria seemed to be everywhere. The health and medical 
services are considered to be the least corrupt of the government institutions, but even they are 
considered to be very corrupt by 41% of Nigerians [35]. Therefore, corruption is one of the 
factors responsible for negative effects on the economy, and the existence of the resource curse 
phenomenon.   The issue of corruption and social injustice range through bribery, poor wages, 
nepotism, discrimination, poverty, poor political leadership, and poor education. 




    
       Source: [34] 
 
Rent-seeking became the most “prominent activity” in Nigeria [15]. Consequently, regional 
and ethnic competitions for control over oil revenues transformed the country’s political system 
into some sort of institutional patronage [36]. Although recent political environment has been 
more stable, for years the country was governed by military regimes, which frequently changed 
through military coups. But the military officers themselves were vulnerable to ethnic 
antagonism, leading to countercoups and ensuing civil wars. The military intervened with a 
coup in 1966. The turbulent military interventions of 1966 yielded nearly a decade of rule by 
General Yakubu Gowon. He sought to address problems of national unity, and presided over 
the early years of the petroleum boom [37]. Increased evidence of corruption amid the oil 
windfall prompted further intervention by the military force. General Murtala replaced Gowon 
in July 1975, promising rapid movement of Nigeria towards transition to civilian rule, greater 
economic probity, and administrative reform. Six months later, Murtala was killed in a failed 
coup attempt and was replaced by the second in command, Olusegun Obasanjo, who continued 
the regime’s programmes. Apart from overseeing the transition to civilian rule, the Murtala-
Obasanjo government advanced an ambitious programme of state-led industrialisation and 
expansive social provisions, in addition to overseeing the transition to civilian rule [38].  
There were a succession of military regimes promising a return to democracy between 1966 
and 1976, but political reform was deferred until 1979 when civilians regained power from 
General Obasanjo. The new civilian regime’s ability to govern quickly diminished due to 
massive corruption, mismanagement, political deception, and epidemic violence, which 
undermined the legitimacy of the democratic system in the eyes of the public. Once again, the 
armed forces stepped in with promises of remedial action. After four years, General Buhari 
terminated the civilian government in 1983 on the grounds that his regime would mitigate 
corruption. Buhari’s regime instigated a new era of military dominance that proved more 
corrosive to the country’s capabilities, economic development, and social stability than the 
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Figure 2: Nigeria Control of Corruption index  (1996-2014) 




Despite their reformist pretensions, military regimes have proven no more capable than the 
civilians at resolving central challenges of state building and development. The tenures of 
Buhari (1983–85), Ibrahim Babangida (1985-1993), and Sani Abacha (1993-1998) traced a 
downward spiral of repression, economic devastation, arbitrary rule, and the erosion of 
institutions as the military, the central bureaucracy, with poor services and infrastructure [39] 
and evidence of extraordinary corruption. The worst thing about Babangida’s regime was the 
abrogation of the democratic transition in June 1993, when it annulled the results of a 
presidential election that was widely regarded with hope of returning the country to civilian 
rule [40]. The ensuing crisis provoked widespread uncertainty, ethno regional antipathy, and 
further economic decline, inducing Babangida to depart and establishment of a Civilian 
Caretaker Committee. This was scrapped in a matter of weeks by the defence minister, General 
Abacha. Abacha behaved in an even more dictatorial manner than his predecessors. He 
contrived a political transition that would perpetuate his rule as a civilian president, and 
controlled the state security leading to the imprisonment or murdering of political opponents. 
During Abacha’s rule, the lack of fiscal discipline and rampant corruption left the economy in 
the doldrums. It is estimated that Abacha amassed a fortune of around US$6 billion over four 
and a half years, which were largely diverted from state owned enterprises and projects or 
embezzled from the public treasury. This magnitude of plunder led to the accelerated decline 
of the education and health systems, public services, and utilities, and therefore had a large 
negative impact on the economy. 
Furthermore, the accumulated plunder of preceding rulers manifested in a depleted treasury, a 
huge debt overhang, dilapidated public institutions, endemic corruption, and simmering social 
hostility, while communal violence exploded in a myriad of conflicts across the country [41]. 
A large political class shows little capacity to address the country’s urgent economic and social 
challenges. The country therefore underwent constant political instability and conflicts, which 
undoubtedly was the most unfavourable context to transform oil revenues into some form of 
development. In addition, the policies of the governments were not sufficiently favourable and 
consistent in promoting the development of agriculture and the non-oil industry sectors [16].   
Given such political environment, there is no doubt that Nigeria has a very weak legal regime, 
with conceptual representation of property to create value being absent from the legal 
framework. Economic development, as argued by classical theories, is based on aggregated 
factors of production capital, land, and other natural resources, in addition to labour or human 
capital. If these classical factors of economic development were enough, it may be asked why 
this has not led to development in places like Nigeria that have an abundance of resources. The 
explanation is that development will not occur unless legal and institutional analyses are taken 
into account [42].  Legal frameworks and regulatory institutions are absolutely vital to ensuring 
a well-developed economy. The key constraints to Nigerian development include poor security, 
extremely weak commercial judicial systems, a generally weak legal system, impunity, 
corruption, and an unviable regulatory framework [43]. These may be described as institutional 
constraints and there is no economic policy which could remove these constraints. Although 
macroeconomic policies are unquestionably important, there is a growing consensus that the 




quality of business regulation, and the legal institutions that enforce it, are a major determinant 
of development [42, 43].  
Ologunla et al. [44] concluded that the institutions of Nigeria are not strong enough to manage 
revenue from oil exports extensively enough to have a positive impact on the economy. There 
is indeed a negative effect of oil dependence in Nigeria on economic growth, which calls for 
strong institutional quality to turn the resource curse of the country into a blessing. Other 
countries with abundant natural resources, such as Botswana and Norway (which is discussed 
later), have escaped the resource curse owing to their strong institutions [12]. Therefore, for 
developing countries in general, good governance, accountability, high government 
effectiveness, good regulation, and anti-corruption policies tend to link natural resources with 
high economic growth. 
Until recently the political economy of Nigeria was a capitalist authoritarian regime, with 
political leaders not being accountable to citizens via competitive elections, suppressed 
freedom of expression, any criticism of the regime being severely punishable, and an 
atmosphere where secrecy in the affairs of state is routine.  It is evident that oil in itself is not 
the curse, rather the unstable political system, weak institutions, inappropriate management of 
oil revenues and mismanagement of the rest of economy, are the curse in the case of Nigeria 
[45].  
Indeed several factors undermined the translation of Nigeria’s oil wealth into development. 
These are: political instability; widespread corruption; a lack of transparency and 
accountability; social unrest; conflict; disregard for due process and the rule of law, the 
weakening of institutions; and inequality in the distribution of wealth. Hence, this led the 
country to not benefit from its wealth. All of these are part of the problems enhancing the 
resource curse in Nigeria [15]. There is an urgent need for increased transparency and 
accountability in the management of Nigeria’s oil revenues [20].   
In summary, as an oil exporter, Nigeria has pursued a resource based growth strategy since 
independence but has been unable to achieve sustainable economic growth. High oil 
dependency has been the basis of economic growth in Nigeria since the 1960s.  Between 1970 
and 2000, and also more recently, growth rates were very volatile in much the same way as oil 
prices.  Oil dependency has caused the Nigerian economy to become stagnant owing to its 
inability to diversify its economy. Furthermore, a nation’s institutions are very important to its 
development, and therefore the quality of institutions play a crucial role to enhance the level 
of economic growth in the country. In this direction, there is significant correlation between 
the level of corruption in Nigeria and the country’s ability to develop its economy positively. 
To address the issue of oil dependence, Nigeria could focus on diversification and 
industrialisation to promote economic growth, in addition to improving the quality of its 
institutions and maintaining a more stable political environment.  
3.  Norway: The Case of a resource blessing 
Norway is the fifth largest oil exporter in the world, with a daily production capacity of 2.4 
million barrels, which is the same level of output as Nigeria [46]. The country has the largest 




oil reserves in Western Europe, with 5.497 billion barrels of proven crude oil reserves as of 
2015 [14]. 
Norway is a country which generally avoided the resource curse, and is often seen by other oil-
rich countries as an example worthy to be emulated. Oil was discovered in 1969 and it has 
managed to successfully steer away from the resource curse by minimizing rent-seeking 
behaviours and corruption. Norway's production grew to one of the highest in the world. 
However, sudden oil revenue inflows did not affect the basic economic structure of country 
and did not unsettle industries in existence before the oil era. Moreover, Norway utilised its oil 
revenue to invest in long term economic growth [47, 48].  
Norway was one of the poorest nations in Europe. The country had a large raw material based 
export industry, with investment predominantly deriving from foreign capital. But from this 
starting point, Norway proved able to combine economic growth and social development, even 
when the economy was exposed to the sudden emergence of two new energy sources; firstly 
hydropower and then oil. The exploration and utilisation of these sources would, to some extent, 
become enclaves in the Norwegian economic structure. Despite this and other elements of 
foreign dependency, Norway did manage to secure additional development blocks related to 
water power and oil.   
Since the 1970s the Norwegian economy has become even more internationally oriented and 
heads the world in key economic, social and political indicators. Norway is ranked 1st out of 
188 countries with regard to HDI. As shown in Table 4, Norway’s HDI value has increased 
from 0.811 in 1980 to 0.944 in 2014, an average annual increase of about 0.45%. Norway 
differs significantly from Nigeria in these metrics, and therefore implies that a country with 
well managed oil wealth will have positive effects on these metrics, and lead to higher 
performance.        
Norway is a rich country with respect to per capita income, which was US$66,141 in 2013 [49]. 
The population is about 5.137 million with unemployment being very low and stable between 
2.3 - 4.7 % since 2003, and is expected to remain low over 2014 - 2016. It is estimated that 1 
out of every 9 jobs in Norway are linked to the oil industry, and there is no person living under 
the poverty line [46]; in addition, Norway is a net external creditor and international aid donor.  
Norway experienced almost one and a half decades, from 1972 to 1986, of high inflation. As 
shown in Figure 3, inflation increased from 5.7%in 1985 to 7.2% and 8.7% in 1986 and 1987 
respectively but, except in 2008, this has stabilised since then.  This could be attributable to a 
more efficient management of the oil wealth, limiting its impact on prices 
  





Table 4: Norway - Selected Human Development Indicators (HDI) 
 




Mean years of 
schooling 
GNI per capita 
(2011 PPP$) 
HDI value 
1980 75.6 13.1 10.3 34,076 0.811 
1985 75.9 13.2 10.9 40,052 0.828 
1990 76.5 14.0 11.5 42,152 0.849 
1995 77.7 15.6 11.8 50,017 0.883 
2000 78.7 17.5 12.0 57,853 0.917 
2005 79.9 17.5 12.3 64,151 0.931 
2010 81.0 17.5 12.6 63,578 0.940 
2011 81.1 17.6 12.6 63,327 0.941 
2012 81.3 17.5         12.6 64,926 0.942 
2013 81.4 17.5         12.6 64,283 0.942 
2014 81.6 17.5         12.6 64,992 0.944 
    Source: [22] 
   



































































































































Figure 3: Norway inflation rate (CPI measurment) (1986-2014)




Norway’s example also demonstrates the wisdom of “leaving the oil underground” argument. 
Keen to avoid the Dutch disease and job losses in other industries, the authorities were reluctant 
to move forward too quickly and they kept offering direct support to the non-oil sectors. 
Licensing activity from 1969 to 1978 was relatively restrictive, and an abundant hydroelectric 
power supply meant that energy needs were less dependent on the new oil discoveries [47].  It 
was considered important to strike the right balance between developing the oil industry and 
other domestic industries, putting in place appropriate institutions, policies, and human capital 
to deal with the new windfall revenue. At the same time, spending increased through subsidies 
on agriculture and industry. 
Norway is a small open economy, which is indeed rich in resources including oil, gas, 
hydropower, and minerals. But its other significant industries are shipbuilding, paper products, 
electronics, timber, textiles, and fishing, an indication of a highly diverse economy. The oil 
sector constitutes about a quarter of GDP and one third of total government income [50]. Its 
GDP amounted to US$499.8 billion in 2014, with an annual growth which averaged at 3.5%. 
The ratio of oil and gas to total exports accounts for just 21%, with exports exceeding imports 
and there are extensive social welfare programmes.  
The management of the petroleum resources reflects the view among Norwegian decision 
makers that the resources belong to the nation, and that the development of the industry should 
benefit society as a whole including future generations. This ambition was challenging for 
several reasons. The oil revenues are temporary, as they are based on a non-renewable natural 
resource. Furthermore, they are highly volatile, due to fluctuations in the oil price and 
uncertainty in the size of the resources. Thus, extraction should be undertaken at a moderate 
pace to ensure that wealth generated from these resources is saved for the future. Therefore, 
the policies for the management and spending of the petroleum wealth have assumed more 
importance, with the establishment of the Petroleum Pension Fund in 1990 and the adoption of 
the fiscal rule in 2001. The fiscal rule was that the spending of oil revenues should be equal to 
the expected real return from the Pension Fund. Therefore, this rule would enable the 
government to run with a permanent non-oil budget deficit, allowing for higher public spending 
and/or lower taxes than would have been possible without the oil revenues [51, 52].  The 
Pension Fund and the fiscal rule was to ensure that the large, volatile, and temporary net cash 
flow from the petroleum sector is transferred to a stable supplement to the government budget. 
Thus, the oil revenues allow higher public spending and/or lower taxes than would otherwise 
have been possible for the entire future. 
Norway, as a successful oil rich country, shows that efficient institutions can turn natural 
resource into blessing, whilst Nigeria’s experiences are a clear example of the resource curse. 
Unlike any other country that has discovered oil wealth, Norway had a modern welfare state in 
place before oil became a key source of wealth for the country. The welfare state became one 
of the institutions that secured a broad distribution of the benefits from oil production. Norway 
has a small population and already had a functioning representative democracy with strong 
institutions when it discovered oil. The Norwegian judicial system enjoys high levels of public 
trust and has a long-standing reputation of independence, competence and integrity. 
Furthermore, the judicial system is among Norway’s least corrupt institutions [53].  Such rule 




of law plays a crucial role for economic development, and therefore can help turn the natural 
resource curse into a blessing, and is evident in the high quality of life and well-being in 
Norway.  
Norway is also politically stable.  Its political leaders are accountable to the public and are 
largely free from corruption. Norway is generally viewed as a non-corrupt country as shown in 
Figure 4. In 2014 it was ranked as the third least corrupt country in the world out of 191 
countries [34]. It is one of the few resource-rich countries that have managed to escape the 
resource curse, using its oil and gas to achieve high standards of living for all its citizens rather 
than for the benefit of elites. 
Norway indeed already had strong institutions when it discovered oil. This gave the country a 
unique starting point, and with all this in place it has managed to distribute its oil wealth to its 
citizens. It has been able to counteract the resource curse and the ‘grabber-friendly’ or rent 
seeking activities that are usually associated with the curse. Mehlum, et al. [10] mentioned 
Norway as an example of how good quality institutions may lead to an escape from the curse. 
Larsen [47, 12] also argued that good institutions are one of the main reasons for the escape 
from the curse as does most empirical studies [54, 55, 56, 57, 58].  Mehlum, et al. [56] study 
on mineral rent and social development in Norway also showed that natural resources in 
Norway kept the economy growing because oil discovery stimulated productive forces rather 
than ‘grabber-friendly’ activities. This was as a result of high quality institutions and 
technological changes of oil extraction. Over the past two decades, Norway has transformed 
oil and gas resources into financial wealth. Oil revenues are invested abroad through a 
Sovereign Wealth Fund, which is managed by the central bank of Norway and in a highly 
transparent manner. It invests exclusively abroad to promote exchange rate stability, and to 
shield the Norwegian economy from the effects of oil-price fluctuations. Its Pension Fund is 
Europe's largest, and lags behind only that of the United Arab Emirates amongst those managed 
by governments [59]. Through investing in the name of future generations, the state has been 
able to absorb 80% of the resource rent [55]. The Government Pension Fund collects the net 
cash flow from petroleum activities and the return on its investments, which is then used to 
finance the government’s fiscal deficit. The Norwegian government has taken a long-term view 
regarding its management of their natural resource wealth and sharing this wealth with its 
citizens.  
Norway has successfully avoided the resource curse for several reasons. It has had a history of 
natural resource management that included integrating natural resource-based industries with 
the rest of the economy through various linkages. Furthermore, Norway's institutions were 
developed to handle shocks to the economy that are endemic to resource production, such as 
large changes in terms of trade. Also, the separation of rents based on natural resource 
extraction from the spending of these rents has gradually led to the establishment of a buffer 
fund that helps to create a more stable economic environment.  The diversification of the 
economy leading to a reduction in the dominance of the oil sector was also essential to escaping 
from the resource curse, and therefore shocks in oil prices have had comparatively limited 
impact on the economy.   




     
Source: [34] 
                                       
4. The UAE: A case of a successful development via oil 
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is the second largest oil producer in the Middle East, 
exporting the equivalent of 3.5% of the total global oil production. Oil was discovered in 1958, 
when the seven separate emirates had the same under-developed economies that depended 
mainly on subsistence agriculture, nomadic animal husbandry, the extraction and trade of 
pearls, fishing, and seafaring. The period before the discovery of oil, therefore, reflected the 
country’s limited natural resources, and resulted in a simple subsistence economy. 
Oil exports started in 1962, with the era of economic development beginning in the early 1970s. 
The establishment of its formal economic, social, and political institutions, coinciding with a 
massive increase in oil production and oil exports, followed the explosive rise in oil prices in 
1973. The major development of the country started in the early 1990s. Since the early 1970s 
the UAE’s phenomenal growth has depended largely on the discovery and exploitation of oil. 
The oil and gas industries are well managed and the latest technology is continuously harnessed 
to increase production efficiency [60, 61]. 
In 2015, proven oil reserves in the UAE were 98.8 billion barrels, approximately 10% of the 
World’s total and the third largest oil reserves in the world after Saudi Arabia and Iraq. The 
country also holds the fourth largest reserves of natural gas in the world. Such huge reserves 
could sustain long-term economic growth in the country. Today, the UAE is a major 
international tourist and business centre as well as one of the most modern, stable and safe 
countries in the world  [62]. 
Since its independence in 1971, the UAE has enjoyed political stability. Existing political 
structures appear to reflect the tribal society of the UAE. The distribution of large oil revenues 
in the form of social and economic infrastructure, high salaries, and high standard of social 
services, such as health and education, has raised the standard of living for UAE citizens and 
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Figure 4: Norway Control of Corruption Index (1996-2014) 




stability has gone hand in hand with liberal trade policies and has paved the way for investment, 
domestically and internationally in the industrial sector. In addition, corruption is a low risk for 
companies in the UAE as it is the least corrupt country in the Arab world [35]. The UAE offers 
a business-friendly environment, with an effective and efficient public administration. It is 
ranked 30th out of 191 countries for their control of corruption [34]. This is one important 
factor in avoiding the resource curse. Figure 5 shows the UAE’s control of corruption score 
from1996 to 2014. It’s mean score was 0.89 points, with a minimum of -0.09 points in 1996 
and maximum of 1.29 points in 2013 [34].   
The HDI value for UAE in 2014 was 0.835, which placed the UAE in the high human 
development category and is ranked 41st out of 188 countries. From 1990 to 2014, the UAE 
HDI value increased from 0.726 to 0.835, an increase of 15.1% or an average annual increase 
of about 0.59%, as shown in Table 5. It can be observed that the UAE has made progress in 
each of the HDI indicators. Between 1980 and 2014, the UAE’s life expectancy at birth 
increased by 9.4 years, mean years of schooling increased by 5.9 years, and expected years of 
schooling increased by 4.7 years. The GNI per capita significantly decreased by about 42% 
between 1990 and 2014 although the country’s per capita GDP is on par with those of leading 
nations at nearly US$25,000. There are many factors accounting for this decline, such as 
inflation, the level of oil production and a rapidly increasing population [63].  The UAE's 
ranking was remarkable given the decline in gross national income. This is probably because 
of the country's significant performance in health and education. Now the UAE is a hub of 
business and culture, and it has therefore used its wealth very wisely to promote its economy.   
In spite of its high oil reserves, the UAE is no longer solely reliant on oil and gas revenues. Oil 
production currently makes up about one third of the GDP and 80% of national revenues are 
derived from oil [64]. The country experienced an average growth of 5% between 1995 and 
2004 [65]. Oil is therefore the foundation of the country’s economy but it cannot be said that 
the economy of the UAE is overly dependent on oil. The majority of the revenues derived from 
oil are invested by the government into infrastructure and non- oil sector development projects.  
The UAE neutralises the resource curse and Dutch disease by pegging its currency to the US 
dollar and investing heavily in modern infrastructure and education [66, 67].  Several strategies 
and policies adopted by the UAE have enabled the country to succeed in the process of 
development via oil.  A few of these are discussed below. 
  









Table 5 UAE Human Development Index indicators 
 




Mean years of 
schooling 
GNI per capita 
(2011 PPP$) 
HDI value 
1980 67.6 8.6 3.6   
1985 69.8 9.8 4.5   
1990 71.5 10.6 5.6 104,901 0.726 
1995 72.9 11.2 7.1 105,505 0.763 
2000 74.2 11.9 8.3 109,644 0.797 
2005 75.4 12.7 9.0 103,840 0.822 
2010 76.3 13.3 9.5 56,624 0.828 
2011 76.5 13.3 9.5 56,208 0.829 
2012 76.6 13.3 9.5 57,078 0.831 
2013 76.8 13.3 9.5 59,124 0.833 


















Figure 5: UAE Control of Corruption Index (1996 - 2014)




Substantial amounts from oil revenue windfalls were invested by the government of the UAE 
into infrastructure improvements, such as airports, seaports, and roads [68].  Heavy investments 
into physical infrastructure hold promise of even more dynamic economic and business 
prospects. The government of the UAE takes advantage of the strategic location of the country 
with 15 seaports, through which goods and raw materials are exported and imported. 
Furthermore, these ports are used for the redistribution of goods and materials from and to 
countries in the MENA region and those of the Indian subcontinent [64]. 
The UAE government has reduced its dependency on oil exports by diversifying the economy, 
creating booming businesses, encouraging tourism, and development of the construction 
sectors. Although the UAE remains somewhat oil dependent, it is the least vulnerable to oil 
price or export volume declines amongst the Gulf countries. Therefore, the UAE economy 
appears the most diversified in the Gulf countries [69].  It is estimated by some economists that 
over the last three decades the UAE has invested around US$7 billion in its industrial 
development and established over 1,000 factories [70].The dominant industries are 
petrochemicals, other chemicals, hydrocarbons, and plastics owing to the country’s oil supplies. 
Over the last decade, the non-oil sector experienced a 9% annual growth. That is the direct 
consequence of the UAE’s government’s commitment to the economic diversification away 
from oil dependence policies [71]. In addition to the above listed industries, the other sectors 
developed include fertilisers, cement, tourism, trade and manufacturing, real estate, 
construction, and financial services [64]. Whilst oil production makes up about one third of its 
GDP, the ratio of new non–oil industries to GDP has increased significantly over the last 
decades.  
A World Bank [71] report indicates that the UAE achieved significant progress in economic 
development due to its commitment to trade and openness, including the introduction of free 
trade zones and economic diversification policies. In addition, the government of UAE favours 
foreign direct investment and has also encouraged companies to invest in manufacturing by 
offering low interest rate loans through the Emirates Industrial Bank [68].  
The government prioritises the establishment of knowledge economy, and that is intended to 
become the “backbone” of the economy. Education and innovation are expected to play a major 
role in increasing productivity and competitiveness. There are a number of successful 
innovation based initiatives which adds to the growth of the country’s economy and creates 
employment.  Recently, Dubai Internet City succeeded in attracting high profile technology 
companies, such as Microsoft, Oracle, and Hewlett–Packard [64]. Development led and 
supported by the government’s economic policy reforms and streamlined foreign investment 
regulations are contributing to an exemplary growth of the UAE economy [68]. 
In contrast, the employment pattern in the UAE does not reflect the structure of output. The oil 
sector employs only 1.6% of the UAE labour force, reflecting the capital-intensive nature of 
the industry. Unemployment rate in the UAE is approximately 0.5%, which means that the 
UAE economy is effectively at full employment. This has been attributed to the cluster of 
public services, transportation, communications, financial markets, and service-based 
industries in the cities. 




The UAE is considered to have stable economic growth in the Middle East and is not directly 
threatened by any global crises at the moment. It’s currency, the AED (Dirham), which is 
pegged to the USD helps to stabilise the currency but it also implies that a fall in the USD 
would erode its purchasing power in relation to imported goods that the country is so dependent 
upon [72]. The government is very aware of this problem and are trying to tackle it with 
initiatives, such as freezing prices on water, electricity, and everyday consumer goods. As 
shown in Figure 6, inflation rate has been under control since 2009, especially when compared 
to 2007 and 2008 [49].. The control of inflation is indispensable in securing its labour force, 
ensuring that workers still find it economically attractive to live and work in the UAE. The 
country has become an important financial centre due to its significant financial and services 
industries. It has emerged as the most important economy in the region, as the country has an 
ambition to be the financial and service sector leader in the Middle East.  
 
 
              Source: [49, 73]  
 
It is clear from the above that political leaders of the UAE prioritise economic diversification 
away from oil generally. Furthermore, the political environment is stable, proactive, and 
progressive for furthering economic growth and innovations [64]. Despite the fact that the 
current government is not democratic, and that political turmoil is present in the region, the 
UAE are politically stable and at low risk, as they are focused on economic development as 
their prime political objective [68].         
But there are still enormous social and economic gaps within the UAE. Firstly, the regional 
inequalities in terms of development among the seven Emirates of the UAE; 50% of total 
manufacturing is concentrated in Abu Dhabi, and when combined with Dubai and Sharjar, 
output reaches 93% of all industrial production [70].Abu Dhabi also represents 80% of total 
non-oil trade in the country [64].  The other four Emirates have little oil, accounting for only 




















Figure 6: UAE inflation rate (CPI measurement)  (2007-2015)




Although the UAE is politically stable, the potential for tension and conflict is there if the gap 
in wealth among the Emirates is not addressed [74]. Social policies issues lead to inequality. 
While many basic social services are provided to expatriates at reduced rates, UAE citizens get 
salaries roughly double of those of expatriates in similar jobs and have access to numerous 
subsidies, grants, loans, and free services which are unavailable to expatriate workers. High 
levels of immigration have resulted in migrant workers comprising more than three quarters of 
the population. The UAE has reaped benefits from foreign skilled and unskilled workers who 
initiated its economic development in the early 1970s, and subsequently have come to sustain 
it. Thus, a small indigenous population, a large migrant population, and immense wealth 
generated by oil are the dominant socio-economic features of the UAE.  
5. Concluding remarks   
This paper has focused on Nigeria, Norway, and the UAE regarding the effects of abundant 
natural resources on their economies. In both the political and economic realm, the main 
indicators of success or failure have been discussed. That is, an evaluation of the economics 
and political nature of the natural resource curse with a brief assessment of likely outcomes in 
the three case studies.      
The policies of Norway and UAE were successful in moving the economy from its full 
dependence on a single sector, the oil sector, to depending on multiple sectors and resources, 
while Nigeria failed to diversify its economy away from oil dependency. As seen in the case 
of Norway, the oil discovery led the country to become one of the most developed countries. 
In contrast, Nigeria, which started its oil boom in 1970, has instead become highly dependent 
on oil revenues.  
Using the corruption index as a measure of institutional quality, Norway ranks third out of 191 
countries evaluated in 2014 and the UAE’s ranks 30th.  By contrast, Nigeria is positioned at 
177th. This indicates a very high level of corruption risk, owing to the lack of overall 
transparency, having no anti-corruption plan in place, and significant opaque off-budget 
expenditures. Norway has avoided the resource curse while Nigeria has experienced a classic 
case, with the latter’s outcome attributed to poor policy choices.  
Nigeria, a major oil exporter in Africa with a fifty-year history of oil exportation, is still 
experiencing the resource curse in its pure form. Almost 90% of its GDP total exports are oil. 
The country is dependent on food imports, the non-oil industries are almost non-existent and 
the vast majority of the population lives under the poverty line. The causes for these lie in 
excessive public spending, mismanagement of boom and bust cycles with unrealistic financial 
projections, consequent borrowing abroad and debt servicing, low demand in domestically 
produced goods, and lack of government investment in infrastructure and non-oil sectors. Oil 
production and exports operate in a constantly unstable political environment with weak 
institutions, along with widespread corruption, absence of accountability, and transparency in 
managing oil revenues. These negative and detrimental effects prevail over developmental 
prospects in Nigeria.   




Norway utilises its oil revenue influxes into long term and sustained development; the economy 
is highly diverse.  Growth rates are steady and rather high, its citizens enjoy one of the highest 
living standards in the world, and there is no person living under the poverty line. The reasons 
Norway managed to reverse negativities and turned oil into an economic and social blessing 
are found in generally sound economic policies, focused on stabilising inflation, creating 
employment, building vast financial reserves abroad in the form of Sovereign Wealth Funds so 
as to shield the economy from oil price fluctuations.  The mature democracy and stable political 
system, with good institutions, accountability, and transparency in managing oil wealth, are of 
paramount importance in turning oil reserves of Norway into a blessing for the country.  
Currently, the UAE is undergoing a remarkable process of development through oil revenues. 
Although oil is the foundation of the UAE economy, just a third of GDP is derived from oil. 
Economic growth is high, and the government invests highly in infrastructure and non-oil 
sector development projects. There is a continuous government commitment to economic 
diversification, open and free trade, favourable conditions for foreign investment, as well as 
prioritisation of education, innovation, and creation of a knowledge economy. The other factors 
adding to UAE’s success story is that the political system, whilst not democratic, is stable. The 
government establishes development as the prime political objective and is the key and active 
actor in the process of development via oil. Yet, in spite of all positive developments, the UAE 
is still to address the challenges of inequalities based on territory, nationality, and gender.  
The assessment in the paper clearly shows that resource-rich countries, especially developing 
ones, have possible options to follow, in terms of policy and institutional setups in avoiding 
the resource curse and turning that into a blessing for the benefit of current and future 
generations.  A possible extension of this paper is a more robust quantitative comparative 
assessment of the three countries, especially relating to the role of institutions in natural 
resource curse, to validate conclusions made here.          
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